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The United States Supreme Court recently construed the Civil Rights
Act' to permit persons deprived of their constitutional rights under color
of state law to recover damages or to seek an injunction against munici-
palities that cause the deprivation. This decision, Monellv. Department of
Social Services of the City of New York, 2 overruled the Supreme Court's
longstanding and much-cited construction of section 1983 in Monroe v.
Pape.- Under Monroe municipalities were excluded from the class of "per-
sons" whose unconstitutional actions were made actionable by the statute.
While broadening the construction of section 1983 "persons" to include
municipalities, the Court adopted a rule which may seriously limit the
utility of section 1983 as a tool for vindicating federal constitutional rights
violated by municipalities. Monell adopts the rule that a municipality may
not be held liable under section 1983 for civil rights violations on any
theory of vicarious liability, including respondeat superior.4 This Com-
ment will consider the reasons offered for and the impact of abandoning
municipality immunity under section 1983. It will then critically examine
the exclusion of vicarious liability from section 1983, and suggest ways to
avoid the barriers presented by Monell to an effective remedy in federal
court for municipalities' constitutional violations.
The position of this comment is that the Supreme Court's dicta against
the imposition of respondeat superior liability on municipal corporations
for the constitutional torts of their employees under section 1983 are not
justified by the language or legislative history of the statute. Despite the re-
jection of respondeat superior liability of municipalities for constitutional
torts in directly implied actions in the few court of appeals decisions con-
fronting the question, implied vicarious liability may be supported by the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,.
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
'The jurisdictional counterpart to this substantive provision is codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
2. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
3. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
4. 436 U.S. at 690-95. See text accompanying notes 57 & 71-79 infra.
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many cases which hold that remedies implied directly from the Constitu-
tion are not subject to limitations in the language or history peculiar to sec-
tion 1983.
In Monell, each of three female employees of the New York City Board
of Education and one female employee of the New York City Department
of Social Services were directed to take unpaid leaves of absence during
pregnancy about a month before the dates their respective doctors would
have ordered. 5 The city employees filed a class action, 6 naming as defen-
dants the New York City School District and its Chancellor Scribner, the
Department of Social Services and its Commissioner Sugarman, and
former Mayor John Lindsay.I The plaintiffs challenged the constitution-
ality of rules and regulations which required women employees to take
leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons,"
and sought injunctive relief and back pay for periods of unlawful forced
leave. 9 District Judge Metzner dismissed the claim for injunctive relief as
mooted by subsequent changes in official policy, dismissed the claim for
back pay against the Board and the Department on the ground that
neither were "persons" against whom section 1983 authorized relief, and
dismissed the claim for back pay against the individual defendants named
in their official capacities on the theory that an equitable order for back
pay against the officials would require payment of city funds and that such
circumvention of municipal immunity was impermissible.' 0 The court of
appeals affirmed."1 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
extension of the municipality immunity doctrine to bar suits for equitable
5. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 394 F. Supp. 853, 854-55
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
6. 357 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
7. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 532 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1976).
8. 436 U.S. at 660-61. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974).
9. 436 U.S. at 661.
10. 394 F. Supp. at 855. The district court and court of appeals opinions in
Monell are representative of a recent line of cases holding that equitable orders
against an individual officer of a municipality named in her official capacity are
impermissible under § 1983 if the order would in effect require the payment of
public funds to the plaintiff. Such cases find support in the Supreme Court's
holding that municipalities are immune from § 1983 liability, in Monroe and
subsequent cases such as Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (barring pendan-
cy of state law claims joined with § 1983 claims against a municipality as contrary
to legislative policy), City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) (extending
the nonperson doctrine to claims for equitable relief as well as for damages), and
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (extending the nonperson doc-
trine to immunize counties). This line of cases included Muzquiz v. City of San
Antonio, 520 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 528 F.2d 499
(5th Cir. 1976). See also Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 528 F.2d
508, 520 (5th Cir. 1976). Muzquiz is analyzed in Levin, The Section 1983 Im-
munity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1504-14 (1977). See also Note, Section 1983
and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1198 n.56 (1977).
11. 532 F.2d at 262-64. 2
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relief in the nature of back pay sought against individual officials named as
defendants in their official capacities, 12 and reversed, overruling Monroe
v. Pape insofar as it holds that local governments are immune from suit
under section 1983.13
After carefully reexamining the legislative history that Monroe had
relied on to justify municipal immunity, the Court concluded that Con-
gress did intend section 1983 to impose civil liability on municipalities for
violations of constitutional rights. The predecessor to section 1983 was sec-
tion 1 of H.R. 320, which became law as the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Cen-
tral to Monroe's construction of section 1983 is the rejection of Senator
Sherman's amendment to H.R. 320 by the House in the spring of 1871.14
The amendment provided that any inhabitant of a city, county or parish
could be held civilly liable for specified kinds of riot damage. It was initi-
ally approved by the Senate as section 7 of H.R. 32015 but was rejected by
the House. 16 The amendment was submitted to Congress in the first con-
ference committee report without substantial change.17 That report was
approved by the Senate 8 but was again rejected by the House.19 A second
conference report limiting liability to persons having knowledge that the
described forms of injury to persons or property were taking place was ap-
proved by both the Senate2" and the House,2 1 and is currently codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1986.22 The Supreme Court in Monroe was convinced that the
rejection of the Sherman amendment by the House revealed Congress to
be so hostile to the imposition of liability for riot damage on municipalities
that the word "person" in section 1 of the 1871 Act could not have been in-
tended to include municipalities. 2 3
12. 436 U.S. at 662.
13. Id. at 663. See text accompanying notes 57 & 71-79 infra, and criticism
in text accompanying notes 80-104 infra.
14. 365 U.S. at 187-92.
15. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 709 (1871). The text of the Sherman
amendment may be found at CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 669 (1871). It is
quoted in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188 n.38, and in the Appendix to Monell, 436
U.S. at 702.
16. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 725 (1871).
17. The first conference report substituted the liability of "the county, city,
or parish" for the original Sherman amendment provision for liability of "the in-
habitants of the county, city or parish." Id. at 749. It is quoted in Monroe, 365
U.S. at 188-89 n.41, and in the Appendix to Monell, 436 U.S. at 703-04.
18. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 779 (1871).
19. Id. at 800-01.
20. Id. at 831.
21. Id. at 832.
22. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
23. 365 U.S. at 194. Apart from this narrowing construction, Monroe
broadly construed § 1983 liability for unconstitutional acts "under color of' state
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Monell surveys the Congressional debates which took place in the
spring of 1871, and concludes thatMonroe drew an unjustifiably broad in-
ference from the rejection of the Sherman amendment by the House. In
short, the Court in Monell concludes that the Forty-second Congress re-
jected the Sherman amendment not because it would have made munici-
palities as well as individuals liable for constitutional violations, but
because it would have authorized holding individuals and municipalities
liable in damages for types of injuries not limited to deprivations of con-
stitutional rights and without regard to whether the municipality was
authorized by the State to prevent such injuries.
Opponents of the Sherman amendment saw that it would indirectly re-
quire municipalities to create local police forces, when there were none in
existence, 24 to keep the peace. Several of its opponents argued that Con-
gress had no constitutional power to impose such duties on state officers or
corporate agents of a state, 25 citing Supreme Court decisions that em-
braced a theory of dual sovereignty. 26 The Supreme Court in Monell
assembles three arguments to show that section 1 of H.R. 320 was not sub-
ject to the same constitutional objection.
First, even opponents of the Sherman amendment admitted that Con-
gress had the power to impose civil liability on municipalities in federal
court "for using their authorized powers in violation of the Constitution. ,,27
Where the States had delegated an obligation to a local governmental enti-
ty, granting jurisdiction to federal courts to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment was unobjectionable. Such a grant of jurisdiction was consistent with
rejecting municipality liability for riot damage where the authority to pre-
vent riot damage had not been delegated to the municipality. Second,
federal courts were not seen as interfering with the states' parallel sover-
eignty when vindicating federal constitutional rights by enforcing the con-
tract clause against municipalities in diversity cases. 28 Monell treats the
contract clause cases as showing that "federal judicial enforcement of the
Constitution's express limits on state power"29 against municipalities was
not subject to the constitutional infirmity seen in the Sherman amendment
by its opponents. Finally, several members of the House opposed the Sher-
man amendment but acknowledged the constitutionality of, or supported,
section 1 of H.R. 320.30 These considerations persuaded the Monell Court
24. Kates and Kouba, Liability of Public Entities under Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 134-55 (1972).
25. 436 U.S. at 673-74 n.30. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 791,
794, 795, 799 (1871); Brief for Amicus Curiae at 22a-31a, Monell v. Department
of Social Services of the City of.New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
26. 436 U.S. at 673-75.
27. Id. at 680.
28. See cases cited 436 U.S. at 673 n.28.
29. 436 U.S. at 681.
30. Id. at 682.
4
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that rejection of the Sherman amendment is consistent with holding
municipalities liable for their constitutional torts.
In addition to finding no reason in the legislative history for inferring a
congressional intention to immunize municipalities from civil liability for
constitutional violations, the Monell Court finds positive support therein
for the view that section 1 was intended to impose liability on municipali-
ties as well as on natural persons. Again, the Court constructs three argu-
ments. The first argument premises that Congress intended section 1 to be
broadly construed, in accordance with the canon of statutory construction
that a remedial statute should be broadly construed.3 1 Representative
Shellabarger, the chairman of the special committee that drafted H.R.
320,32 expressly cited this canon of construction in the speech in which he
reported the bill out of committee. Shellabarger explained that "the
largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in
construing such statutes," and insisted that it would be "strange and, in
civilized law, monstrous were this not the rule of interpretation." s33 Since
municipal corporations are as capable of violating a person's constitu-
tional rights as are natural persons, the Supreme Court in Monell holds
31. J. SUTHERLAND, 3 STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01
at 29 (C. Sands 4th ed., 1974). See also id. § 72.02 at 374, 375, § 72.05 at 391-94.
32. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1871). It is worthwhile to con-
sider the circumstances surrounding the drafting and passage of the bill that
became § 1983. In the spring of 1871, while there was much concern in Congress
about the spread of racially and politically motivated violence in the southern
states visited on Negroes and Republicans by the Ku Klux Klan, Congress was
reluctant to enact legislation tailored to meet the problem of these so-called "out-
rages in the South," at least until after a full-scale investigation had been con-
ducted to determine the extent of Ku Klux violence. Representative Lewis,
CONG. GLOBE, supra, at 335. The Senate and House passed a concurrent resolu-
tion to appoint a joint select committee to inquire into the "condition of the late
insurrectionary states." Id. at 135, 182, 560. Repeated motions to adjourn the ses-
sion were introduced, and it appeared that the 42d Congress would adjourn the
1st session without passing legislation to deal with the problem of the Ku Klux
Klan. On March 23, 1871, however, President Grant delivered a message to both
houses of Congress that renewed the sense of urgency to act. Id. at 236, 244;
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174. Grant's message referred to the "condition of affairs...
in some States of the Union rendering life and property insecure" and "urgently
recommend[ed] such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectively
secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the
United States." Representative Shellabarger was named to head a select House
Committee to which Grant's message was referred. CONG. GLOBE, supra, at 249.
The message was sent on a Thursday; by the following Tuesday, H.R. 320 was
reported out of committee, and a long and bittter debate on its provisions began.
The House substantially considered no other business until the bill was passed,
and debates were carried on through a special Saturday session, a special morn-
ing session, and late into four evening sessions. The bill gained the approval of the
House on April 6, 1871, only two weeks after Grant's message was received.
33. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 68 (1871); 436 U.S. at 684.
518 [Vol. 44
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that "there is no reason to suppose that municipal corporations would have
been excluded from the sweep of § 1."14
Secondly, H.R. 320 was titled and was indexed in the Globe'5 as a bill
to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, which forbids un-
compensated takings by a state. Representative Bingham, the author of
section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, took the view in the debates on
H.R. 320 that section 1 of that bill would provide a remedy against a city
that takes property without providing just compensation.3 6 In light of
these considerations, the Court concluded it was not reasonable to infer
that Congress intended municipalities to be immune from suit under sec-
tion 1983.
Finally, decisional and statutory law had come to treat municipal cor-
porations as natural persons by the time the Civil Rights Act became law.
In Cowles v. Mercer County," decided only two years before passage of the
statute, the Supreme Court had decided that municipal corporations
should be treated just as the Court had treated business corporations in an
earlier case, i.e., to all intents and purposes they were to be deemed
natural persons.38 Further, Congress itself had defined "person" to include
bodies politic and corporate "in all acts hereafter passed," in the so-called
"Dictionary Act," passed less than a month before Shellabarger's commit-
tee finished drafting H.R. 320.39
The Supreme Court also suggests that the municipal immunity doc-
trine is irreconcilable with the Court's consistent assumption of section
34. 436 U.S. at 686.
35. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1872-73); CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. XLVII, LXXXIII (1871).
36. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 84 (1871); 436 U.S. at
686-87. Such a remedy had been denied under the fifth amendment in Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 464 (1833), on the ground that the fifth amendment
taking clause was a restriction only on the power of the federal government, and
Representative Bingham explained that he had Barron especially in mind wherq
he drafted § 1 of the fourteenth amendment.
37. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118, 121 (1868), cited in Monell, 436 U.S. at 688.
38. Louisville R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 193, 201 (1844); 436 U.S.
at 687-88.
39. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431; Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190; 436
U.S. at 688. In acknowledging that the Dictionary Act provision controls inter-
pretation of § 1983, the Court adopts a view commonly espoused by critics of
Monroe's nonperson doctrine. Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities under-
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 133 n.12 (1972);
Note, Suits Against Municipalities for Equitable Relief under Section 1983, 87
HARV. L. REV. 252, 257 n.29 (1973); Note, Developing Governmental Liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201,1206 n.26 (1971). TheSupreme
Cburt in Monell disagreed with Monroe that this definition of person was merely
advisory, and held that the Dictionary Act provided a mandatory rule of con-
struction, at least absent a showing that Congress intended the word "person" to
be used to exclude "bodies politic and corporate" in the Civil Rights Act. 436 U.S.
at 689 n.53. Monell did not view the rejection of the Sherman amendment as pro-
viding such a showing of congressional intent.
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/6
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
1983 jurisdiction over school boards, since there is no persuasive ground on
which to distinguish municipalities from school boards for section 1983
purposes.40 In particular, the Court suggests that the legislative history
does not support treating school boards differently from other corporate
agents of the State. As Monell reads that history, the rejection of the Sher-
man amendment warrants treating constitutional torts differently from
riot damage but not treating the constitutional torts of school boards dif-
ferently from those of municipalities. 41 The fact that treating school
boards differently from other entities of state government is inconsistent
does not of itself justify the Court's choice of a rule of liability for all
municipal entities over a rule of immunity for all municipal entities. 42 The
Court finds justification for a rule of municipality liability in recent con-
gressional refusals to enact proposals to strip federal courts of jurisdiction
over school boards in desegration cases and in recent congressional
40. See cases cited 436 U.S. at 663 n.5. The Court further states that "the
principle of blanket immunity established in Monroe cannot be cabined short of
school boards," hence cases "holding school boards liable in§ 1983 actions are in-
consistent with Monroe . . ." 436 U.S. at 696.
41. "Moreover, the constitutional defect that led to rejection of the Sher-
man Amendment would not have distinguished between municipalities and
school boards, each of which is an instrumentality of State administration." 436
U.S. at 695-96.
42. A number of federal courts of appeals had extended the municipal im-
munity doctrine to insulate school boards from § 1983 liability. Mims v. Board of
Educ., 523 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1975); Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201
(4th Cir. 1975); Adkins v. Duval County School Bd., 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.
1975); Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1974);
Wright v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 501 F.2d 25, 27 (8th Cir. 1974); Harvey v.
Sadler, 331 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1964). Other decisions expressly left the question
open. Stapp v. Avoyelles Parish School Bd., 545 F.2d 527, 531 n.7 (Sth Cir. 1977)
(unnecessary to decide whether members of the school board are persons if school
board is not because jurisdiction found under 28 U.S.C. § 1331); Campbell v.
Gadsen County Dist. School Bd., 534 F.2d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 1976); Berg v. Rich-
mond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1975) vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 434 U.S. 158 (1977) (§ 1983 jurisdiction over school
district and board "may be questionable' but jurisdiction found under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th
Cir. 1975); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 805
(9th Cir. 1975); Kelly v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 517 F.2d 194 (5th
Cir. 1975); Roane v. Callisburg Indep. School Dist., 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1975);
Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 507 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1975);
Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d '714, 717 (8th Cir. 1974); Akron Bd. of Educ. v.
State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 1285, 1291 (6th Cir. 1974). Most of the circuits fac-
ing the question had also extended Monroe's nonperson doctrine to immunize
universities and colleges from § 1983 liability. Hill v. Trustees of Indiana Univ.,
537 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. Board ofJr. College Dist., 523 F.2d 569
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Hander v. SanJacinto Jr. Col-
lege, 522 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1975); Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota, 507
F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 952 (1975); Gresham v.
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authorization of funds to help school boards comply with court orders in
desegration suits. 43 Although Congress has failed to enact proposals to ex-
tend immunity to school boards, the inference is not compelled that Con-
gress would choose the universal liability alternative since Congress has
been equally inactive on proposals to legislatively overrule Monroe .44
A final reason for broadening the definition of section 1983 "persons,"
not made explicit in Monell's majority opinion, is suggested in the last
paragraph of Justice Powell's concurring opinion. Justice Powell expresses
concern that if the Court failed to extend section 1983 liability to munici-
palities it could not long postpone deciding whether a cause of action
against municipalities may be "implied" directly from the fourteenth
amendment for its violation. 45 The availability of a damages remedy in a
directly implied cause of action was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents. 46 The Court's
extension of municipality immunity under section 1983 to preclude ac-
tions for injunctive relief as well as for damages in City of Kenosha v.
Bruno47 has encouraged lower federal courts to approve directly implied
action. Bruno itself strongly suggests that where the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment is infringed by a municipality, a cause of ac-
tion would lie against the municipality and federal jurisdiction may be
founded on 42 U.S.C. § 1331.48 Despite its apparent approval of the
43. 436 U.S. at 696-97 & n.62.
44. See, e.g., S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. s201-05 (daily
ed., Jan. 10, 1977). For a catalogue of bills introduced to accomplish legislative
reversal of Monroe, see Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1060 (3d Cir. 1977)
(Garth, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3122 (1978). See also Levin, The
Section 1983 Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1542 n.227 (1977); Note,
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1197 n.49 (1977).
45. 436 U.S. at 712.
46. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment remedy against federal nar-
cotics agents for an invasion of constitutional rights similar to that alleged in
Monroe).
47. 412 U.S. 507 (1973). See cases cited note 121 infra.
48. In Bruno, applications for renewal of liquor licenses were denied to
plaintiffs without adversary hearings, apparently because the taverns featured
nude dancing. The licensees brought a § 1983 action against the municipalities
involved. An injunction against the enforcement of the licensing statutes issued
by the court of appeals was vacated by the Supreme Court, which held that the
"nonperson" doctrine of Monroe precluded § 1983 suits against municipalities
not only for money damages but also for injunctive relief: "We find nothing... to
suggest that the generic word 'person' in § 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated
application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of the relief
sought against them." 412 U.S. at 513. Significantly, the Court remanded the
cause for a determination whether plaintiffs had met the $10,000 amount in con-
troversy requirement for general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, suggesting that a cause of action directly implied from the fourteenth
amendment might lie against municipalities for constitutional deprivations. See
412 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Bodensteiner, Federal Court
Jurisdiction of Suits against "Non-Persons" for Deprivation of Constitutional
8
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directly implied action by remanding the case in Bruno, the Supreme
Court has never expressly held that a cause of action stated directly under
the Constitution will lie against municipalities. In Mt. Healthy School
District Board of Education v. Doyle49 the Court said that whether such an
action would lie was still an open question. Nonetheless, the Bivens-Bruno
precedents have led nearly every federal circuit court of appeals to address
the question whether direct actions are free of section 1983 immunity im-
pediments, and most have permitted suits against municipalities to redress
constitutional violations.50 The question whetherJustice Powell is justified
in the view that Monell will reduce the pressures to resort to a Bivens theory
of recovery against municipalities will be discussed later.
The impact of Monell may be far-reaching. Monroe's establishment of
municipal immunity has been said to limit the utility of section 1983
damages actions against state-inflicted constitutional deprivations more
than any other single ruling. 51 The municipality immunity doctrine was
often an insurmountable obstacle for a victim of a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights in search of a financially responsible defendant against whom
to seek a judgment. Monell may permit effective recovery where before
there was none, and to that extent render the Bivens alternative less attrac-
tive.52 As will emerge more clearly later, however, the exclusion from sec-
tion 1983 liability of municipal employers for the unconstitutional acts of
Rights, 8 VAL. U.L. REV. 215, 221 n.48 (1974); Note, Damage Remedies against
Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 942 n.113
(1976); Note, Suits against Municipalities for Equitable Relief under Section
1983, 87 HARV. L. REV. 252, 255 n.16 (1973).
49. 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). See text accompanying notes 111-14 infra.
50. See note 120 infra.
51. Note, Damage Remedies against Municipalities for Constitutional Vio-
lations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 957 (1976). Monell may tend to increase the
rapidly expanding volume of federal civil rights litigation. In 1974, 8,207 civil
rights actions were filed, or 5.73% of the total 143,284 federal district court cases
filed; by 1977, the number of civil rights actions filed had risen to 13,114 or 8.2%
of the total 163,492 federal district court cases filed. The 1977 figures represent a
59.8% increase in the civil rights actions filed over the 1974 figures, while the
total number of federal district court cases filed increased 14.1% in the same
three years. It is not known how much of the increase is attributable to the avail-
ability of directly implied Bivens:type actions. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR U.S. COURTS, REPORT FROM THE
DIRECTOR (1974 and 1977).
52. At least where policy or custom is alleged so that § 1983 jurisdiction may
be invoked, directly implied actions may be more difficult to maintain, because
28 U.S.C. § 1331 requires that the amount in controversy be at least $10,000,
Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514
F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975) (actual damages of $500 alleged; no allegation of malice
to support claim for $9500 in punitive damages), and because courts may adopt
more stringent constitutional requirements for the directly implied cause of ac-
tion than for § 1983 suits. Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1978),
Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977). See also Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d
793 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4643 (U.S. June 5, 1979) (No. 78-5072).
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their employees may prevent Monell from dramatically expanding civil
remedies for constitutional injuries. 53 Cases involving an unconstitutional
express policy as in Monell may be less common than cases in which consti-
tutional violations are a matter of custom, flowing from unarticulated
habits and biases of municipal employees. The latter are much more diffi-
cult to document, and there may be some judicial reluctance to recognize
the existence of customary violations of constitutional rights in section
1983 actions, even where the plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief.5 4
Although a section 1983 action alleging unconstitutional municipal
custom does not require a showing of intentional misconduct, the prob-
lems involved in proving the existence of an unconstitutional municipal
custom are analogous to the problems commonly observed in showing in-
tentional discrimination in the enforcement of state penal laws. 5 If the
courts remain reluctant to see the failure to correct statistically significant
patterns of constitutional violations by municipal employees as involving a
custom of the entity so that the entity is viewed as the cause of the viola-
tions, the right to legal or equitable relief against the entity for customary
constitutional violations may be of little practical value.
Like Monroe, which broadly construed "color of state of law"5 " but
narrowly construed "persons," Monell has a narrowing aspect which may
more than offset the expansive impact of abandoning the municipal im-
munity doctrine. Monell lays down the rule that there may be no recovery
53. See text accompanying notes 105-08 infra.
54. An example of judicial reluctance to acknowledge the existence of un-
constitutional municipal custom or to find that toleration of a pattern of viola-
tions itself causes further violations may be seen in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1975). The district court heard evidence on ap-
proximately 40 incidents of alleged police misconduct occurring within a year.
357 F. Supp. at 1294-1316. The district court did not find an unconstitutional
departmental policy but held there existed a "pattern of frequent police viola-
tions" of constitutional rights. 357 F. Supp. at 1318. In dissolving the district
court's mandatory injunction to revise grievance and disciplinary procedures, the
Supreme Court held that the named defendant officials' "failure to act in the face
of a statistical pattern" did not give rise to liability under § 1983. 423 U.S. at 376.
See Note, Availability of FederalEquitable ReliefAgainst Police Supervisory Per-
sonnel, 90 HARV. L. REV. 238, 240-41 (1976). See text accompanying notes 61-64
infra.
55. Such discrimination was found actionable in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373-74 (1885). For an analysis of these problems of proof, see Com-
ment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1122-31 (1961). The author contends that actions to en-
force the right to evenhanded application of state laws face proof problems that
are exacerbated by a lack of judicial flexibility in judging attempts to prove dis-
criminatory practices, and that these problems "may be insurmountable in the
face of the present judicial reluctance to be persuaded that state enforcement
agencies have in fact violated the constitutional right to nondiscrimination." 61
COLUM. L. REV. at 1141.
56. 354 U.S. at 184. See notes 23 supra & 144 infra. 10
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against a municipality for civil rights violations on any theory of vicarious
liability, including respondeat superior.57
The Court states several arguments against using respondeat superior
as a theory of recovery under section 1983 which warrant careful attention.
It quotes the language of the statute as passed, providing a civil cause of
action against a person who "shall subject, or cause to be subjected"
another to a deprivation of her rights, and focuses attention on the word
"cause." ' The Court reads the word "cause" narrowly, and holds that
unless the employee of the governmental entity caused the injury pursuant
to a policy or custom of the entity, it is not proper to say that it was the en-
tity that caused the injury. The Court does not construe the use of "cause"
in section 1983 to encompass the common law rule holding a principal
liable for the torts of its agents.59 The mere use of the word "cause" is taken
to rule out imputed causation.
Monell's analysis of what constitutes "cause" for section 1983 purposes
is not entirely new. The same account of section 1983 causation surfaced
two years earlier in the Supreme Court's decision in Rizzo v. Goode .6o In
Rizzo, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ordered revisions in the
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, police department manuals and procedures
for hearing citizen grievances. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
section 1983 does not support the granting of relief against defendants
whose conduct "played no affirmative part"6 1 in the deprivation of rights
57. "[W]e conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because
it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable
under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in
original). See also 436 U.S. at 663 n.7. Monell's rule relates to the entity-
employer, the employee's true master, and consequently is not to be confused
with a rule that superior officers cannot be held liable for actions of their inferiors
because the superiors are "not the masters of the tortfeasors but fellow-servants of
the same master." Kirtland, Vicarious Liability Under Section 1983, 6 IND. L.
REV. 509, 520 (1973). But see Smith & Singer, Limitations on FederalJudicial
Power in Civil Rights Cases: "Persons," Eleventh Amendment, Immunities,
Vicarious Liability, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 711, 735 and n.148 (1978).
58. 436 U.S. at 692. For an examination whether such restriction of the
Court's attention does justice to the language and history of § 1983, see text ac-
companying notes 88-104 infra.
59. See notes 85-87 infra.
60. 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). "The plain words of the statute impose
liability.., only for conduct which 'subjects, or causes to be subjected' the com-
plainant to a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws." Id.
Rizzo finds that this requirement was not met where "there was no affirmative
link between the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the
adoption of any plan or policy-express or otherwise-showing their authoriza-
tion or approval of such misconduct." Id. This "affirmative link" test in Rizzo
has, in Monell, matured into a "policy or custom" test of municipal liability, but
the primary argument supporting such restrictive interpretation remains the
analysis of "cause." See generally Note, Rizzo v. Goode: The Burger Court's Con-
tinuing Assault on FederalJurisdiction, 30 RUTGERS L.R. 103, 122-24 (1976).
61. 423 U.S. at 377.
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of which plaintiff complains. Rizzo anticipated Monell's exclusion of
vicarious liability when it distinguished cases finding liability against
school boards under section 1983 in school desegregation cases by explain-
ing that in those cases the administrators and school board members "were
found by their own conduct" to have denied plaintiffs' constitutional
rights. 62 Rizzo suggested that section 1983 would not be available to vindi-
cate a deprivation of constitutional rights against defendants who merely
"had in their employ a small number of individuals, which latter on their
own deprived" persons of their constitutional rights. 63 Hence, Rizzo, like
Monell, rejects the broader notion of vicarious liability, then attempts to
apply that rejection to the narrower notion of respondeat superior.64
The Supreme Court also finds support for its conclusion that section
1983 does not authorize municipal vicarious liability in Congress' rejection
of Sherman's proposal to hold individuals or municipalities liable for riot
damage occurring in their locality. 65 The Court argues that with the rejec-
tion of the Sherman amendment, Congress rejected the "only form of
vicarious liability presented to it,"66 and that vicarious liability, unlike
municipality liability in general, "would have raised all the constitutional
problems associated with the obligation to keep the peace. "67 The Court
also asserts that because common arguments for vicarious liability did not
move the House to approve the Sherman amendment, Congress did not in-
tend vicarious liability to be imposed under section 1983.68 The arguments
62. Id. (emphasis in original); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Rizzo
also distinguished police cases Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1976), and Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), where a causal link was found between the conduct
of named defendants and the plaintiff's injury. 423 U.S. at 373-75. Amazingly,
the Court then emphasizes a further feature that distinguishes Hague and
Medrano from Rizzo: "[T]here was no showing that the behavior of the Phila-
delphia police was different in kind or degree from that which exists else-
where ...... 423 U.S. at 375. In fact, the district court found the problems
highlighted by plaintiffs "fairly typical" in urban settings. Council of Organiza-
tions v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See Note, Rethinking
Federal Injunctive ReliefAgainst Police A buse: Picking up the Pieces After Rizzo
v. Goode, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 530, 540 (1976). Clearly, the fact that constitutional
abuses of a certain type are widespread should not be a defense to a § 1983 action,
since the Congress that passed H.R. 320 in 1871 was motivated by the alarming
spread of Ku Klux Klan violence, perceived to be encouraged by official tolera-
tion. See note 32 supra.
63. 423 U.S. at 377.
64. "By our decision in Rizzo v. Goode ... we would appear to have decided
that the mere right to control.., is not enough to support § 1983 liability." 436
U.S. at 694 n.58.
65. See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
66. 436 U.S. at 693 n.57.
67. Id. at 693.
68. Id. at 693-94. 12
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inferring a congressional intent to exclude vicarious liability from the re-
jection of the Sherman amendment will be examined more closely later. 69
The reasons advanced by the Supreme Court for rejecting respondeat
superior under section 1983 are not entirely persuasive, for several reasons.
These reasons include the following, to be discussed seriatim: (1) The
analysis of what constitutes "cause" is inconsistent because it vicariously at-
tributes the acts of some agents to the municipal entity but not those of
other agents; (2) the analysis of "cause" overlooks the alternative wording
of the statute; (3) the rejection of the Sherman amendment was not a rejec-
tion of respondeat superior, because that proposal would not have limited
liability to actors or their agents; (4) the fact that arguments commonly ad-
vanced in support of vicarious liability failed to persuade Congress to
adopt the Sherman amendment does not show that vicarious liability is not
imposed under section 1983, because similar arguments were used by pro-
ponents of section 1983 itself in the Congressional debates in 1871; (5)
the policy of deterring constitutional abuses is thwarted without
respondeat superior because institutional organization carries inherent
potential for abuse that will be unreachable under the requirement of
direct causation; and (6) if Bivens actions are construed to be free of con-
straints to which section 1983 is subject, Monell's narrow aspect will en-
courage increasing use of directly implied actions.
As set out above, 70 the majority opinion's dicta7 1 that section 1983 does
not permit holding a local governmental entity liable on a theory of
respondeat superior rests heavily on analysis of the word "cause." Despite
the fact that a municipal corporation is an "artificial" person72 that can act
only through its agents, the Court reads section 1983 to exclude liability for
injuries "inflicted solely by its employees or agents. ' 73 The Court asserts
that "Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action
pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a consti-
tutional tort. 74 The Court makes clear, however, that constitutional
deprivations pursuant to "policy of some nature" include customary
deprivations "even though such a custom has not received formal approval
through the body's official decisionmaking channels. ' 75 The principal
argument against- imposing respondeat superior liability under section
1983 is set out in a crucial passage:
69. See text accompanying notes 88-104 infra.
70. See text accompanying notes 57-68 supra.
71. Because Mr. Justice Stevens considered the portion of the Monell major-
ity opinion that interprets § 1983's requirement of cause to exclude respondeat
superior of corporate entities "merely advisory and not necessary to explain the
Court's decision," he refused to concur in that portion of the opinion. 436 U.S. at
714.
72. E.g., Louisville R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 193, 201 (1844).
73. 436 U.S. at 694, 663-64 n.7.
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[The statutory language "any person who . . .shall subject, or
cause to be subjected"] plainly imposes liability on a government
that, under color of some official policy, "causes" an employee to
violate another's constitutional rights. At the same time, that
language cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on
governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor. Indeed, the fact
that Congress did specifically provide that A's tort became B's
liability if B "caused" A to subject another to a tort suggests that
Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such
causation was absent.7 6
The statute does not "plainly" address the question of B's liability where B
causes A to cause a deprivation of C's constitutional rights. Nevertheless,
the Court restricts a municipality's statutory liability to this single situa-
tion. Moreover, the Court adopts a remarkable rule for determining when
an entity will be said to cause its agent to cause a constitutional injury. The
entity is causally responsible only when a constitutional deprivation is in-
flicted through the execution of policy or custom created by officials
"whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy or
custom."77 In adopting this test for deciding when the entity will be treated
as the cause of a constitutional injury, the Court acknowledges that a
governmental entity can act only through its agents; the policy-making
acts of higher-level agents will be vicariously attributed to the governmen-
tal employer. The policy of forcing pregnant employees to take unpaid
leaves of absence before required to do so for medical reasons was itself
both created7 s and dismantled 79 by agents and officers of the city. How-
ever, the Court will not permit the Constitution-violating acts of lower-
level agents, if at variance with local policy or custom, to be vicariously
attributed to the governmental employer. The Court's announcement of a
rule excluding vicarious liability is misleading at best, since the Court con-
templates permitting suits against the municipal employer when certain
employees act to adopt unconstitutional policies. This inconsistency is
even more obvious in the case of custom than in that of policy, since the
acts of employees that simultaneously establish and express a customary
and unconstitutional practice are attributed to the entity: those acts con-
76. Id. at 691-92 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)).
77. Id. at 694. Monell "unquestionably involves official policy as the moving
force of the constitutional violation found by the District Court." Id.
78. Monell's allegation that her leave of absence was ordered pursuant to
citywide policy was supported by a letter received from an administrator in the
Division of Personnel Relations of the Department of Social Services. Amended
Complaint at 13, item 28, Brief for plaintiff, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
79.' The issues presented by plaintiffs' claim for injunctive and declaratory
relief were held mooted by the change in policy made with respect to the Depart-
ment of Social Services by Deputy Mayor Edward K. Hamilton, and with respect
to the School Board by the voting members of the Board of Education of the City
of New York. 394 F. Supp. 853, 855. 14
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stitute the entity's customary practice, and the entity may thereby be sub-
ject to civil liability for those acts.
Given that the Court does contemplate a limited application of
respondeat superior under section 1983, the distinction between agents
whose unconstitutional acts can bind the entity and those whose unconsti-
tutional acts cannot bind the entity, if drawn according to the level of the
agent within the heirarchy of the governmental body, seems arbitrary.80
The criteria for selecting the class of agents whose policy-making acts will
be attributed to the entity is left uncertain. The rule that it is only "those
whose edicts and acts may fairly be said to represent official policy" 1 who
may subject their employer to section 1983 liability suggests that the cri-
terion will be one of fairness to the entity: if it is unfair to say that an
agent's acts represent official policy, the plaintiff will be unable to hold the
entity liable in an action for damages or injunctive relief. This transforms
the inquiry from the question of whether a governmental employee de-
prived the plaintiff of constitutional rights while acting within the scope of
employment and under color of state law into the question of whether it is
fair to hold the entity liable for the acts under consideration. It is submit-
ted that this question of fairness is not one for the courts to decide in each
case, because it is the very policy question which was settled by Congress
through legislation in 1871. There is no principled way to distinguish the
acts of "policymakers" from those of employees who "implement" policy.
It is a strained construction of section 1983 that denies a plaintiff relief
against an entity for the unconstitutional acts of some employees on the
theory that those acts did not rise to the level of setting unconstitutional
policy or expressing unconstitutional custom.
In a part of Monroe v. Pape which Monell does not overrule, the Court
held that section 1983 does not require a showing of specific intent to
deprive plaintiff of constitutional rights as does 18 U.S.C. § 242, which im-
poses criminal liability on a person for wilfully violating another's constitu-
tional rights. 2 The difference between the criminal statute and the statute
80. This is especially true in instances where the greatest discretion and in-
teraction with the public, and thus the greatest opportunity to deprive persons of
their constitutional rights, are at the lowest levels of the governmental organiza-
tion. See Kirtland, Vicarious Liability under Section 1983, 6 IND. L. REV. 509,
510 (1973).
81. 436 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 242 was originally passed in 1866, and § 1983 was modeled
after it. Representative Shellabarger, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at App.
68 (1871); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961). Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91 (1945), reaffirmed the holding in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
(1944), that "color of state law" in 18 U.S.C. § 242 included acts committed while
the wi'ongdoer is "clothed with the authority of state law," but held that the use of
the word "wilfully" imported a requirement that the constitutional violation be
done with specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right. Monroe based its
broad interpretation of § 1983 on the construction given "under color" in 18
U.S.C. § 242 in Screws. Monroe, however, rejected the argument that the analogy
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creating a civil remedy was underscored in an oft-quoted passage that sec-
tion 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.
8 3
Monell adopts this analogy when it refers to section 1983 violations as "con-
stitutional torts" and to individual section 1983 defendants as "tort-
feasors. ' 84 In 1871, it was a settled principle of law that corporate
employers were civilly responsible for the tortious acts of their employees. 5
If, as the Court held shortly before the passage of section 1983,6 it is im-
proper to distinguish municipal corporations from business corporations
and both are to be treated as natural persons, it is incongruous to hold a
business corporation for the torts of its agents but refuse to hold a munici-
pal corporation for the constitutional torts of its agents. Again and again,
the Supreme Court has incorporated restrictive elements of the common
law of torts in interpretations of section 1983.87 It is anomalous that while
the Court purports to construe section 1983 liberally, it incorporates
elements of the common law that restrict liability but refuses to incor-
porate elements of the common law that would extend liability.
between the two statutes should be extended to require a showing of specific in-
tent under § 1983, both because § 1983 does not contain the word "wilfully," and
because the state of mind requirements of a statute imposing a civil remedy are
different from those of a statute imposing criminal sanctions. 365 U.S. at 183-84,
187.
83. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). A major aspect of the dis-
tinction between tort liability and criminal liability is that while respondeat
superior developed as a part of the common law of torts in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries as a response to the growth of industry and commerce, "no
such development took place in criminal law." Sayre, CriminalResponsibilityfor
Acts of Another,.43 HARV. L. REv. 689, 694 (1930).
84. 436 U.S. at 691, 692.
85. Kirtland, Vicarious Liability under Section 1983, 6 IND. L. REv. 509,
514-15 (1973); Sayre, supra note 83, at 693; Wigmore, Responsibility for Tor-
tious Acts: Its History II, 7 HARV. L. REv. 383 (1894). See W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *429-30: "[T]he master is answerable for the act of his servant, if
done by his command, either expressly given, or implied: nam quifacit per
alium,facitperse .... [W]hatever a servant is permitted to do in the usual course
of his business, is equivalent to a general command." The dicta inMonell in effect
measures the liability of the employer of a constitutional tortfeasor, though the
state has clothed him with its authority, much as the common law would measure
the liability of the employer of an independent contractor who commits a tort.
86. Louisville R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 193 (1844), cited inMonell,
436 U.S. at 687-88.
87. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judicial immunity based on
the finding that the defendant acted within his jurisdiction in ordering the sterili-
zation of the plaintiff); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute im-
munity for prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967) (absolute
immunity for judges acting within the judicial role); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951) (absolute immunity for legislators under § 1983). See Kirtland,
Vicarious Liability under Section 1983, 6 IND. L. REV. 509, 514-15 (1973); Note,
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1199-1204 (1977).
16
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It would be worthwhile to reexamine the reasons offered for a standard
of municipal liability which appears to be both internally inconsistent and
inconsistent with the established analogy between constitutional torts and
common law torts. The Court's narrow focus on the use of the word
"cause" in section 1983, in the Rizzo-Monell analysis, neglects the fact that
the statute is worded in the alternative: "subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected." The statute uses two different formuli, and apparently imposes
liability on a constitutional tortfeasor in two distinct situations: where the
tortfeasor causes a deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, and
where the tortfeasor subjects the plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional
rights. The verb "cause" takes as its object the deprivation; the verb "sub-
jects" takes as its object the person injured. This difference in the grammar
of the terms used suggests a substantive difference in theories of liability
authorized by those terms.8 8 In a case where the defendant subjects the
plaintiff to a deprivation of her rights, the statute directs attention to the
person injured. From the injured party's point of view, when a deprivation
is caused by a governmental agent while acting within the scope of employ-
ment and is made possible only because the agent is cloaked with the
authority of the state, it is the power of the entity employer that intrudes
on her privacy, threatens her security, and affronts her dignity. The canon
of statutory construction counseling avoidance of an interpretation
rendering statutory language meaningless or superfluous is violated by the
Court's construction of the statute. 89 The Supreme Court does not justify
the attempt to read the language "subjects, or" out of section 1983 by its
interpretation in Rizzo and Monell. Because that language appears to ex-
pand the types of causal responsibility to which section 1983 attaches, it is
perplexing that the Court adopts a single, and unprecedentedly narrow,
concept of causation under the statute.
The speeches of several congressmen in debates on H.R. 320 in 1871 -
section I of which is now codified as section 1983-suggest that "subjects,
or causes to be subjected" was intended to capture more than a single
theory of causal responsibility for a deprivation of constitutional rights to
which liability would attach. It is important to bear in mind that while the
impetus for passage of the bill was the widespread increase in Ku Klux
Klan violence, "the remedy created was not a remedy against it or its
members but against those who representing a State... were unable or
unwilling to enforce a state law." 90 The use of such indirect means in an at-
88. For the view that the meaning of "subjects" as it is used in § 1983 is not
coextensive with that of "causes to be subjected," see Note, The Federal Injunc-
tion as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE LJ. 143, 147
n.19 (1968).
89. J. SUTHERLAND, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
46.06 at 63 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1974). Cf. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S.
528-39 (1955).
90. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-78 (1961) (emphasis in original).
See, Note, Rethinking Federal Injunctive Relief Against Police A buse: Picking
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tempt to provide redress for the Klan's constitutional violations was
repeatedly explained in the debate. Representative Stevenson of Ohio
urged the passage of H.R. 320 in the following language:
Denial [of equal protection] may, therefore, be either active or
passive. It is more frequently passive than active .... Unexecuted
laws are no "protection." And this brings us to the very case: The
States have laws providing for equal protection, but they do not,
because either they will not or cannot, enforce them equally; and
hence a class of citizens have not "the protection of the laws."
Union men, white and black, are "denied" the protection of the
laws as completely as if the laws excepted from their operation "all
cases of outrage by Ku Klux upon Republicans, white or
colored."91
Representative Mercur of Pennsylvania also focused attention on the four-
teenth amendment's proscription against the denial of equal protection
and due process of law by the states. He thought it "very obvious" that the
word "deny" as it was used in the fourteenth amendment "means to refuse,
or to persistently neglect or omit to give that 'equal protection' imposed
upon the State by the Constitution." 92 Again, Representative Perry of
Ohio argued that when the fourteenth amendment forbids a state to deny
equal protection, it forbids the state to "fail to afford or withhold the equal
protection of the laws."" A Congress that was willing to impose liability on
a municipal corporation that "passively" denies equal protection to its
Up the Pieces After Rizzo v. Goode, 7 RUT.-COM. LJ. 530, 556-57 (1976).
91. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 300 (1871). Note that Rizzo
refused to find § 1983 liability because:
There was no affirmative link between the occurrence of the various in-
cidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by
petitioners-express or otherwise-showing their authorization of such
misconduct .... Instead ... the sole causal connection found by the
District Court ... was that in the absence of a change in police discipli-
nary procedures, the incidents were likely to continue to occur....
423 U.S. at 371. It is difficult to reconcileRizzo's refusal to base§ 1983 liability on
the inefficiency of local enforcement of sanctions against offenders with
numerous speeches in the 1871 debates that justify the passage of H.R. 320 by
reference to the failure of local law enforcement processes. See, e.g., the speeches
of Representative Pratt of Indiana, CONG. GLOBE, supra, at 505; Representative
Voorhees of Indiana, id. at 179; Representative Hoar of Massachusetts, id. at
334; Representative Osborn of Florida, id. at 653; Representative Garfield of
Ohio, id. at App. 153; Representative Stoughton of Michigan, id. at 321;
Representative Coburn of Indiana, id. at 457; Representative Burchard of Il-
linois, id. at 312; Representative Rainey of South Carolina, id. at 394: "The
judge of this circuit is sitting on his bench, the machinery of justice is in working
order; but there can be found no hand bold enough to set it in motion."
Representative Beatty of Ohio referred to the testimony of "learned judges within
whose circuits . . . the State made no successful effort to bring the guilty to
punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and innocent." Id. at
428.
92. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at App. 181 (1871).
93. Id. at App. 79. 18
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citizens by failing to bring Klan members to justice was equally prepared to
hold the same municipality liable for the active denial of fourteenth
amendment rights through the acts of its own employees. As the Supreme
Court interprets section 1983, civil liability is imposed on a municipality
that withholds, fails to afford, refuses, neglects, does not give, or does not
grant the equal protection of the laws to some of its citizens through inef-
fective enforcement of those laws against non-employees who attack those
citizens, yet it does not impose liability on the municipality that far more
directly denies the equal protection of the laws when its own agents attack
those citizens.94 The congressmen's concern that the enforcement statute
should reach not only active but also passive denials of constitutional rights
is roughly expressed in the statute's distinction between "subjects X to a
deprivation of rights" and "causes a deprivation of X's rights." This much
is clear: Congress did not intend a narrow reading of "cause" to circum-
scribe section 1983 liability, and could not have so intended if the cause of
action provided against persons under color of state law was to effectively
deter and remedy Ku Klux Klan abuses.
The Supreme Court bolsters its analysis of "cause" with a supplemental
argument against imposing respondeat superior liability on a governmen-
tal employer by referring to the legislative history of H.R. 320. No direct
reference to respondeat superior is found in the debates, but the Court
returns to Congressional rejection of Senator Sherman's proposed amend-
ment to H.R. 320 for "a clue to whether it would have desired to impose
respondeat sufierior liability." 95 The Court asserts without elaboration
that "all of the Constitutional problems" raised by opponents of the Sher-
man amendment are presented by imposing liability on a governmental
94. The inadequancy of Monell's view that the Congress that passed § 1983
did not contemplate that imposition of vicarious liability under the statute is
evidenced by the way in which supporters of H.R. 320 conceptualized the relation
between the fourteenth amendment's limitations on states and § l's prohibition of
action by persons. The primary source of congressional power to pass H.R. 320
was found in § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Representative Blair of Missouri
argued that H.R. 320 unconstitutionally overstepped § 5's grant of congressional
power. He emphasized the fact that the fourteenth amendment prohibits certain
actions by states and does not mention individuals, but the proposed enforcement
statute imposes liability on persons and exempts the state. CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. at App. 208. Representative Blair's criticism was answered by
Representative Mercur of Pennsylvania, who simply defined "state" as used in the
fourteenth amendment to mean the people of the state: "[T]he clear import and
meaning of the term 'State,' in the sense in which it is used in this section is free
citizens or people dwelling within the limits of an organized state." Id. at App.
181. See also the speech of Representative Perry of Ohio, defining "state": "The
primary meaning is the people." Id. at App. 80. The attribution of acts of people
of a state to the state itself is necessary to get aroud Representative Blair's con-
stitutional objections to § 1 of H.R. 320. Nevertheless, Monell rejects the
analogus vicarious attribution of responsibility from municipal employees to their
employers as inconsistent with the legislative history of § 1983.
95. 436 U.S. at 692 n.57.
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employer for tile unconstitutional acts of its employees. 96 The problems to
which the Court alludes are those associated with imposing the obligation
to keep the peace on a local entity to which that obligation had not been
delegated by the state. Monell holds that section 1983 does not impose
liability on a municipality for failure to perform a duty which has not been
delegated to it, but only for exercising delegated state authority so as to
violate constitutional rights. For this reason, and because contract clause
cases supply ample precedent for enforcing federal constitutional guaran-
tees against municipalities, section 1983 is immune to the constitutional
infirmity of the Sherman amendment. These two reasons also distinguish
vicarious liability under section 1983 from the liability sought to be im-
posed by the Sherman amendment.9 7 The Court's assertion that
respondeat superior raises the same constitutional problems raised by the
Sherman amendment is not borne out by an examination of what the
Court identifies as those constitutional problems.
Discernible in Monell is a distinct thread of argument for rejecting
respondeat superior liability based on the rejection of the Sherman
amendment by the House. The Congress is said to have spurned the only
form of vicarious liability presented to it when it rejected the Sherman
amendment. However, the Sherman amendment did not involve respon-
deat superior at all, because it did not limit liability of municipalities to
constitutional abuses by their employees, but sought to impose liability for
non-constitutional injuries (property damage and personal injuries)
caused by any persons "riotously and tumultuously assembled."98 The
Court acknowledges that "the fact that Congress refused to impose vicari-
ous liability for the wrongs of a few private citizens does not conclusively
establish that it would similarly have refused to impose vicarious liability
for the torts of a municipality's employees." 99 In a crucial passage, Monell
premises rejection of respondeat superior on the specious argument that
Congress did not intend to impose vicarious liability for riot damage on
municipalities and therefore did not intend to impose "a more general
liability" in the form of respondeat superior.00 The reference to more
general liability is patently misleading: respondeat superior is not broader
than the liability sought to be imposed by the Sherman amendment; it is
considerably narrower, since limited to employees, over whom the
employer has the right of control. It is apparent that the Supreme Court in
96. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra for an exposition of those
problems.
97. A governmental employee acting within the scope of her employment
and under color of state law does act upon authority delegated to her; and the
contract clause cases provide precedent for imposing liability on the entity for
failing to conform its employees' conduct to constitutional norms.
98. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 709 (1871).
99. 436 U.S. at 693 n.57. "[T]he nature of the obligation created by that
amendment was vastly different from that created by § 1 ... ." 436 U.S. at 664.
100. 436 U.S. at 694.
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Monell makes the same type of logical error that it did in Monroe; congres-
sional rejection of one narrowly defined type of liability is taken to
manifest an intention to reject other quite distinct types of liability.101 In
disapproving the Sherman amendment in its initial form and as revised in
the first conference report, the House rejected a proposal combining at
least five distinct features:
(a) vicarious liability
(b) for the acts of non-employees (anyone riotously and tumultuously
assembled)
(c) that result in certain types of property damage and personal in-
injury (without reference to violation of constitutional rights)
(d) imposed on municipalities
(e) that had not been delegated authority to keep the peace.
Monroe mistakenly interpreted Congress' action as rejecting feature (d)
(the imposition of liability on municipalities) in all circumstances, when it
was only in conjunction with the other features, particularly (e) (the lack of
delegated authority to keep the peace), that the Sherman amendment was
seen to be defective.102 Monell overrules Monroe precisely because the
Court's reexamination of the legislative history of Section 1983 sensitized it
to the importance of feature (e) in the debates over the Sherman amend-
ment. Monell then attempts to shift ground from finding a congressional
intent to reject (e) to finding a congressional intent to reject (a) (vicarious
liability) in all circumstances. Again, this inference is unjustifiably broad.
It was only in conjunction with the other unique features of Sherman's pro-
posal that vicarious liability was rejected. Indeed, that Congress rejected
'the imposition of vicarious liability on municipalities where not restricted
to constitutional violations by employees clothed with municipal authority
may give rise to the inference that vicarious liability would have been ac-
ceptable were such restriction present.
The Court's observation that common arguments advanced in support
of vicarious liability failed to move Congress to adopt the Sherman amend-
ment'03 is immaterial to the liability sought to be imposed under section 1
of H.R. 320 -now Section 1983 -because those arguments are of the type
used by supporters of section 1 to urge its passage. The three arguments
discussed by the Court for adopting vicarious liability are that such liabil-
ity will deter abuses, that it will spread the cost of compensating the indi-
vidual victim of constitutional deprivation, and that vicarious liability will
be fair when limited to the imposition of liability on an employer by virtue
101. Similar considerations have led one commentator to assert that "the
distinction drawn in Monell between direct and vicarious liability perpetuates an
unsound and unsupported interpretation of the Sherman amendment debate...
." Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in
Federal Courts, 51 TEMPLE L.Q 409, 412-13 (1978).
102. 436 U.S. at 673-76.
103. 436 U.S. at 693-94.
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of its right to control the conduct of an employee who deprives another of
her rights. The argument that liability would deter constitutional abuses,
particularly by the Ku Klux Klan, and the argument that victims of depri-
vations of their constitutional rights ought not be left to bear the burden of
the deprivation, are precisely what moved Congress to pass H.R. 320.104
The speeches in support of H.R. 320 catalogue Ku Klux Klan abuses in a
manner calculated alternately to evoke a visceral response against perpe-
trators who escape punishment and to evoke sympathy for their uncom-
pensated victims. The fact that the arguments for passage of H.R. 320
bear a strong resemblance to arguments often used to justify the imposi-
tion of liability on an employer for the errant conduct of its employees
supports rather than undermines the view that the Civil Rights Act incor-
porates respondeat superior liability. The rejection of the Sherman
amendment is as much a red herring in the inquiry into the intent of Con-
gress in using the word "cause" in section 1 of H.R. 320 as it was in the
inquiry into Congress' intent in using the word "person": it obscures rather
than highlights the type of liability imposed by section 1983.
The Court's rejection of municipal liability for the constitutional torts
of employees disserves important public policy of deterring infringement
of constitutional rights and compensating victims of such infringements.
There are elements of institutional organization which, while their
presence is not readily discernible by conventional standards of causation,
tend to encourage the occurrence of constitutional injuries. In the wake of
Rizzo's direct-causation interpretation of section 1983, a recent comment
focused attention on the way in which a "judicial approach ... grounded
in individual-based fault concepts" is inadequate to explain or to remedy
abuses inherent in "institutional behavior patterns."10 5 In the context of
police abuses, the authors draw on a variety of sociological and psycho-
logical studies to isolate sources of unconstitutional "organizationally
elicited behavior." These sources include the lack of effective disciplinary
procedures, the paramilitary organization, the training experience (pri-
marily through street apprenticeship), and the measures used to evaluate
an individual's performance.1 06 While the causal efficacy of such institu-
104. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-83 (1961). Justice Douglas' opinion
for the majority in Monroe canvasses the debates on H.R. 320 and distills three
primary purposes in its passage: to override discriminatory state legislation, to
provide a remedy for injuries where state law is inadequate to provide one, and to
supply a remedy where a state's remedy is unavailable in practice. By far the
greatest attention in the debates was devoted to the third purpose, as it is that
purpose which is expressed in the paramount concern with remedying and deter-
ring Ku Klux Klan violence.
105. ' Note, Rethinking Federal Injunctive ReliefAgainst Police A buse: Pick-
ing Up the Pieces after Rizzo v. Goode, 7 RUT.-CAM. LJ. 530, 534 (1976). See
also Note, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1219, 1229
(1977); Note, Damages Remedies against Municipalities for Constitutional
Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 957 (1976).
106. Note, supra note 105, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. at 545-47, 552-53.
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tional factors in molding behavior is a commonplace in nonlegal litera-
ture, 0 7 it is not clear that the Supreme Court's requirement of proof of
unconstitutional municipal "custom" as a precondition of liability under
section 1983 could be satisfied by proof that techniques of training and
evaluation, for example, lead individuals to be insensitive to constitutional
safeguards. Consequently, the policy behind section 1983 of providing a
primarily federal forum for the vindication of federal constitutional rights
will be thwarted under Monell's construction of section 1983 where viola-
tions are committed by the employees of municipal corporations. There
are abuses inherent in institutional organization with its network of occu-
pational incentives that will be unreachable under a requirement of direct
causation.108
As suggested above, where a plaintiff suffers a constitutional depriva-
tion at the hands of a municipal employee which cannot easily be charac-
terized as resulting from the implementation of a policy or custom of the
entity, Monell denies that plaintiff a section 1983 remedy against the
municipality. Yet because an injunction running only against individually
named officers or agents of the entity may be unenforceable against suc-
cessors without notice of the order,10 9 and because a damages judgment
against individually named officers may prove uncollectable against
salaried governmental employees,1 0 the plaintiff will have strong motive
to seek to bind the entity with her judgment. Consequently, Monell will
continue to generate pressure to expand causes of action against munici-
palities directly implied from the Constitution by analogy to Bivens where
respondeat superior can supply the theory of liability. To the extent that
such development of the federal common law is unpredictable and vari-
107. See, e.g., Lefkbwitz, Psychological Attributes of Policemen: A Review
of Research and Opinion, 31 J. Soc. IssuEs 3, 5 (1975); sources cited in Note,
supra note 105, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. at 534-36 and nn.23-29.
108. Despite the authors' suggestion that police structure is "substantially dif-
ferent from other bureaucracies," Note, supra note 105, 7 RUT.-CAM. LJ. at 541
n.60, an analysis stressing the relation of procedures for selection, training,
evaluation, discipline, and organization of officers and agents to the disposition
to comport with constitutional requirements can productively be applied to a
broad spectrum of municipal corporations, departments, and agencies.
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d).
110. Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities under Section 1983 of the
CivilRights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131, 131 (1972); Kirtland, Vicarious Liabili-
ty under Section 1983, 6 IND. L. REv. 509, 510 (1973); Note, Developing Govern-
mental Liability under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1201, 1201 (1971).
But see Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 586
(1978); Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Williams
v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453, 548 P.2d 1125 (1976) (en banc)
(California required to indemnify officials held liable for civil rights violations))
RSMo § 105.710 (Supp. 1978) (authorizing the state to defend certain state
employees and to pay final judgments rendered against them for acts arising out
of the performance of official duties); Levin, The Section 1983 Immunity Doc-
trine, 65 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1488 n.13 (1977).
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able across circuits, rendering a citizen who must rely on an implied cause
of action less secure in her constitutional rights, Monell's rejection of
respondeat superior liability under section 1983 is unfortunate.
Dicta inMonell indicate that section 1983 does not authorize holding a
municipality liable for the constitutional torts of its employees. What has
been said so far suggests that those dicta are based on a faulty analysis of
the statute's language and an inaccurate view of the history of its passage.
Further, this narrow construction of section 1983 lacks conceptual con-
sistency, and is unfortunate as thwarting the policy behind the statute of
providing a federal forum for victims of constitutional abuse by municipal
corporations. Turning from the analysis of the scope of municipal liability
for constitutional violations under section 1983, the balance of this com-
ment will focus on whether a person deprived of constitutional rights by a
municipal employee may assert a cause of action directly implied from the
Constitution against the municipality-employer. The Supreme Court in
Monell attempts to justify the exclusion of respondeat superior liability
under section 1983 by reference to the statute's unique language and legis-
lative history. Such considerations are not relevant to a cause of action
which is derived not from the statute but is stated directly under the Con-
stitution.
Monell provides an answer to only one of the two questions expressly
left open in Mt. Healthy School District Board of Education v. Doyle.I1 I
Mt. Healthy reserved not only the question whether school boards are per-
sons for section 1983 purposes 2 but also observed that the question
whether a cause of action analogous to that implied in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents" 3 should be implied "directly
from the Fourteenth Amendment which would not be subject to the limi-
tations contained in section 1983, is one which has never been decided by
this court.""14 The Court in Monell does decide that school boards, as well
as municipalities, are persons for section 1983 purposes," 5 but maintains
that the governmental entity could not be held vicariously liable under sec-
tion 1983. Monell does not address the question whether a Bivens action
will lie against municipalities on a vicarious liability theory. The first
obstacle to extending a cause of action by analogy to Bivens may be found
in the reasoning of Bivens itself. The majority opinion in Bivens was care-
ful to qualify its finding of a cause of action arising directly from the fourth
amendment for violations of its provisions by federal agents by cautioning
that direct causes of action arising under the Constitution ought not to be
111. 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (action alleging wrongful termination of employ-
ment of nontenured teacher for exercise of first amendment rights).
112. 429 U.S. at 279, cited in Monell, 436 U.S. at 663.
113. 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
114. 429 U.S. at 278.
115. In overruling the Monroe nonperson doctrine, Monell undercuts the ex-
tension of that doctrine to school boards in lower federal court decisions. See note
42 supra.
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lightly implied. The Court suggests that it might have been persuaded not
to imply a cause of action in a case in which Congress had expressed a
policy opposed to extending a damages remedy: "The present case involves
no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action
by Congress."11 6 This passage suggests that the Constitution does not com-
pel the judicial implication of a remedy directly from the right embodied
in the Constitution.1 1 7 The Court in Bivens suggests that the affirmative
action by Congress that might pre-empt an implied damages remedy must
be the provision of "another remedy, equally effective in the view of Con-
gress.""" However, two circuit courts of appeal have been persuaded that
the failure to offer an equally effective remedy against governmental
employers for the constitutional torts of their employees-an omission by
Congress rather than affirmative action -supports refusal to imply a cause
of action against municipalities directly from the Constitution.119 Under
the Monroe interpretation, Congress did not provide a civil remedy against
municipalities for deprivations of constitutional rights and by its rejection
of the Sherman amendment was understood to oppose extending such a
remedy to injured parties. Nevertheless, most circuit courts of appeal have
not taken the congressional failure to provide a remedy against munici-
palities as precluding the direct implication of a cause of action against
municipalities under the Constitution.1 20 City ofKenosha v. Bruno helped
116. 403 U.S. at 396.
117. Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1978); Kostka v. Hogg,
560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977).
118. 403 U.S. at 397. See Judge Goldberg's brilliant dissent in Davis v.
Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 809-12, 815 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4643
(U.S. June 5, 1979) (No. 78-5072) (en banc majority declined to imply a cause
of action against former United States Representative Passman for sex dis-
crimination in the termination of his female administrative assistant). Judge
Goldberg observes that Bivens only speaks of deferring to congressional ac-
tion after deciding that some remedy is constitutionally required: "[T]he voice of
Congress is relevant, if at all, only in guiding the court in its determination as to
whether damages provide an appropriate remedy. There is no suggestion in
Bivens that Congress can negate the existence of every remedy which might vin-
dicate a constitutional right.... ." 571 F.2d at 815 (emphasis in original). See also
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1532, 1548 n.89 (1972).
119. Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1978); Kostka v. Hogg,
560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977). Molina and Kostka considered the question of
whether courts should defer to congressional action not merely to assess the ap-
propriateness of a damages remedy but to determine whether the constitutional
right required an implied remedy.
120. Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 1978) (fourteenth
amendment action seeking damages for the taking of private property for public
use without compensation); Nix v. Sweeney, 573 F.2d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 1978)
(fourteenth amendment action alleging illegal search and seizure; jurisdiction
founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1331); Pitrone v. Mercandante, 572 F.2d 98 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 99 (1978) (fourteenth amendment; beating by
police; jurisdiction found under § 1331); Lister v. Commissioners Court, 566 F.2d
490 (5th Cir. 1978) (class action challenging reapportionment remanded to per-
mit proof of amount in controversy for § 1331 jurisdiction); Dellums v. Powell,
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to encourage the recognition of a directly implied cause of action against
municipalities for constitutional deprivations despite the reigning view
566 F.2d 216, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3147 (1978) (arrested
demonstrators alleged violation of first amendment rights; held, directly implied
cause of action under § 1331 is not restricted by § 1983 municipal immunity);
Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 196-97 (2d Cir. 1977) (fourteenth amendment
liberty interest violation alleged in school board's termination of teacher); Owen
v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 933 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated and remand-
edforfurther consideration in light ofMonell, 98 S. Ct. 3118, modified, 589 F.2d
335 (8th Cir. 1978) (fourteenth amendment liberty interest violation alleged in
termination of police chief; jurisdiction for equitable relief including backpay
found under§ 1331); Buch v. Board of Educ., 553 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 3122 (1978) (fourteenth amendment due process held not
violated in termination of former high school guidance counselor; decision on
merits); Stapp v. Avoyelles Parish School Bd., 545 F.2d 527, 531 n.7 (5th Cir.
1977) (first and fourteenth amendment action arising out of termination of
school principal, jurisdiction under § 1331); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538
F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1976) (first and fourteenth amendment action for termination of
college teacher remanded for determination on the first amendment claim,
assuming jurisdiction under § 1331); Campbell v. Gadsden County Dist. School
Bd., 534 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976) (first amendment action against borough for
termination of building inspector; cause remanded with leave to amend pleading
to allege § 1331 jurisdiction); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.
1976) (action alleging violation of fourteenth amendment property rights in ur-
ban renewal project remanded for proof of amount in controversy for § 1331
jurisdiction); Reeves v. City ofJackson, 532 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1976) (fourth,
eighth, and fourteenth amendment action arising out of jailing of unconscious
plaintiff for 22 hours without medical care states a claim for damages with
jurisdiction founded on § 1331); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975)
(alleged violation of right to privacy, eighth amendment, and fourteenth amend-
ment due process and equal protection rights arising out of unauthorized perma-
nent sterilization of black girl; jurisdiction founded on § 1331); Reich v. City of
Freeport, 527 F.2d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 1975) (first and fourteenth amendment ac-
tion arising out of termination of police officer; jurisdiction founded on § 1331);
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 718-19 n. 7 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976) (alleged violation of right to marital privacy and
fourteenth amendment liberty right in public hospital's policy against permitting
fathers in the delivery room during birth; found jurisdiction under § 1331, but no
violation of rights); Hostrop v. Board ofJr. College Dist., 523 F.2d 569, 577 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976) (fourteenth amendment property
rights allegedly violated in discharge of college president without a hearing in
breach of extant employment contract states a cause of action under § 1331);
Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S 934 (1976) (jurisdiction for challenge of zoning plan found
under § 1331); Hander v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 522 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1975)
(alleged violation of first and fourteenth amendment rights in termination of
teacher for noncompliance with _grooming regulation; jurisdiction found
under § 1331); Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1, 8 (7th Cir. 1975) (action seeking in-
junctive relief for failure to enforce constitutional standards for arrest and search
in police conduct remanded for proof of amount in controversy for § 1331 juris-
diction); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 696 (7th Cir. 1975)
(alleged denial of equal protection in adoption of zoning ordinance permitting
construction of shopping center; jurisdiction found under § 1331, but ordinance
upheld on merits); Kelly v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 517 F.2d 194, 26
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that municipalities were nonpersons for section 1983 purposes.121 Monell
replaces the nonperson doctrine with a rule denying respondeat superior
liability under section 1983, and justifies that rule on a view of the congres-
sional intent in using the word "cause" which parallels Monroe's construc-
tion of "person." Neither Monroe nor Monell gives an account of the
legislative history of section 1983 that discloses affirmative action by Con-
gress in providing another, equally effective remedy. Consequently, the
cases which imply a cause of action against municipalities for deprivations
of constitutional rights despite the nonperson doctrine may support by
analogy the implication of a directly implied cause of action against
municipalities for such violations on a theory of respondeat superior,
despite Monell's dicta against respondeat superior under section 1983.
Several recent federal circuit court of appeal decisions have addressed
the question whether a directly implied cause of action will lie against a
municipality for deprivations of constitutional rights caused by its
employees on a theory of respondeat superior. In McDonald v. State of
Illinois, 12 2 the plaintiff had been tried and convicted of murder and spent
197 (5th Cir. 1975) (alleged racial discrimination in failure of school board to
rehire nontenured black elementary school teachers in court-ordered desegrega-
tion; dicta that jurisdiction might be invoked under § 1331); Hanna v. Drobnick,
514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975) (fourth amendment damages claim against city
growing out of building inspection ordinance; held, complaint states a cause of
action and jurisdiction would obtain under § 1331 but for failure to prove juris-
dictional amount); Roane v. Callisburg Indep. School Dist., 511 F.2d 633, 635
(5th Cir. 1975) (fourteenth amendment violation alleged in termination of school
superintendent without a hearing before the end of contract term of employ-
ment; jurisdiction found under § 1331); Cardinale v. Washington Tech. Inst.,
500 F.2d 791, 796 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (fourteenth amendment property inter-
est allegedly violated in termination of teacher with a hearing, jurisdiction found
under § 1331); United Farmworkers v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 802
(5th Cir. 1974) (fourteenth amendment equal protection allegedly violated in
refusal to permit housing project to tie into city's water and sewer systems; juris-
diction founded on § 1331); Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156, 1157 n.2
(5th Cir. 1974) (fourteenth amendment property interest allegedly violated in
demolition of property under nuisance ordinance; dicta that § 1331 would sup-
port a claim against a city but ordinance upheld). District court cases are col-
lected in Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal
Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 409, 417 n.31 (1978).
121. 412 U.S. 507 (1973), cited in, Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 196 (2d
Cir. 1977); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 931 (8th Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 98 S. Ct. 3118, modified, 589 F.2d 335
(8th Cir. 1978); Stapp v. Avoyelles Parish School Bd., 545 F.2d 527, 531 (5th Cir.
1977); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 582 F.2d 920, 922 (Sd Cir. 1976); Amen v.
City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554, 558 (6th Cir. 1976); Roane v. Callisburg Indep.
School Dist., 511 F.2d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1975); United Farmworkers v. City of
Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 801-02 (5th Cir. 1974).
122. 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977). Cf. Mahone
v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3122 (1978),
which declined to decide the question of whether vicarious liability could be im-
posed in a directly implied cause of action against a municipality for a constitu-
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over a year serving a 100-150 year sentence. He was released and ultimately
pardoned "based on innocence" after another person confessed to the
crime. 2 3 The plaintiff brought an action for damages against the City of
Chicago, Cook County, the Department of Corrections, several named
police officers, sheriffs, police supervisors, and the Superintendent of the
Department of Corrections for violations of his fourth, sixth, and four-
teenth amendment rights. 124 The Seventh Circuit recognized that a cause
of action to redress constitutional violations may be implied against a
governmental entity, citing Bivens, but refused to permit such an action
against Cook County on a theory of respondeat superior. The court dis-
tinguished Hostrop v. Board ofJunior College District'2 5 in which it had
held the Junior College Board liable in damages for discharge of its presi-
dent without a fair hearing in breach of a valid employment contract.
Hostrop differed, it was said, as involving a situation in which "[t]he gover-
ning board of the entity had itself taken the action which deprived the
plaintiff of a property right, without due process."'' 26 McDonald contains
dicta that the rule inHostrop might reasonably be extended to hold an en-
tity liable for unconstitutional acts of "an inferior employee when his act
was required by a policy adopted by the governing board."' 27 However,
because McDonald's complaint did not allege that the defendants police
officer's conduct was required by any policy of Cook County, the court
would not imply a direct cause of action.
It is remarkable that McDonald adopts an even narrower test for find-
ing that a governmental entity itself violates a plaintiff's constitutional
tional injury. Mahone involved allegations that certain Pittsburgh policemen il-
legally arrested black plaintiffs, beat them with fists and nightsticks, verbally
abused them, brought false charges of traffic violations against them, and caused
convictions of those charged in magistrate court through the giving of perjured
testimony. Plaintiffs sought damages for violations of their fourteenth amend-
ment rights. The grounds of relief against the City of Pittsburgh were that "under
the Fourteenth Amendment the city is liable on a respondeat superior basis for
the misconduct of its officers." 564 F.2d at 1021. The Third Circuit declined to
decide this issue, holding that "in view" of jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a
"Fourteenth Amendment remedy should not be implied." 564 F.2d at 1024. For
an analysis of Mahone and its treatment of vicarious liability of municipalities
under § 1981, see Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Munici-
pal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 409, 420-32 (1978).
123. 557 F.2d at 599.
124. The complaint included a count alleging that county police officers
refused to permit McDonald's attorney to photograph him in custody shortly after
his initial apprehension, when photographs would presumably have shown evi-
dence of a beating and corroborated his account of events leading up to his being
found unconscious near the scene of the murder. The court of appeals apparently
found this allegation constituted a denial of sixth amendment right to counsel,
and reversed the district court's dismissal of the action against the individual
responsible and remanded for further proceedings against Officer Weil.
125. 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976).
126. 557 F.2d at 604.
127. Id. 28
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rights in a directly implied cause of action than does Monell under section
1983. The McDonald test appears to. narrow entity liability in two ways: it
excludes from the class of entity-caused violations those acts of employees
which are not pursuant to officialpolicy, even though the acts may be part
of a customary pattern of constitutional deprivations; and it excludes from
the class of entity-caused violations those acts of employees which are not
required by official policy.1 28 Monell would permit section 1983 suits to
128. Id. at 604: "[T]here is no allegation that any policy of Cook County...
required Weil to refuse an opportunity to photograph plaintiff." Similarly, the
court of appeals in Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 98 S. Ct. 3118, modified, 589 F.2d 335
(8th Cir. 1978) recognized a cause of action directly implied from the fourteenth
amendment for depriving a former police chief of a liberty interest without due
process by terminating him without a hearing under stigmatizing charges. How-
ever, the court expressly reserved the question whether an implied action should
be entertained on a theory of vicarious liability, adopting for implied actions a
limitation that parallels that adopted inMonell for § 1983 actions. The court im-
plied that monetary liability would not be imposed on municipalities "absent
proof that the city's policy-making agencies or officials knowingly encouraged or
tolerated such conduct. . . ." 560 F.2d at 933-34 n.9. The United States Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the cause for reconsideration in the light of Monell.
98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978). The Eighth Circuit on remand modified its earlier opinion,
holding that because the city was not absolutely immune from suit for constitu-
tional violations, it was unnecessary to reach the question of a directly implied
cause of action. However, the court went on to find that the city was immune on
the ground that it had acted in good faith and without malice. Monell left open
the possibility of a "qualified immunity" for municipalities under § 1983. The
court of appeals opinion on remand in Owen asserts that there is such an immun-
ity, and further sculpts the contours of the immunity after the model provided in
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975). Wood provides immunity for
individual defendants upon a showing that both objective and subjective tests of
good faith have been met. Owen applies this same dual test of liability to munici-
palities, as it found both that the City of Independence had no malice and that it
did not know and could not reasonably have *known, two months before the
Supreme Court's decisions in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1973) and
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), that firing Owen without a stigma-
dispelling hearing constituted a violation of the plaintiff's due process rights.
Neither Monell nor Owen pause to analyze whether the underlying rationale
for extending such a "good faith" immunity to officials applies in the case of
municipalities. Wood found immunity because imposing liability on individual
school board members would unfairly impose the burden of good faith mistakes
on the decision-maker, would deter independent and unintimidated decision-
making, and would deter capable candidates from seeking official positions. 420
U.S. at 319-22. Similar reasons are recited in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
240 (1974). Accord, Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2911 (1978) (extending to
federal agent defendants in directly implied actions a qualified immunity analo-
gous to that available to state official defendants in § 1983 cases). These reasons
for immunity have no application when it is the municipal entity itself from which
an injured plaintiff seeks compensation: there is no specter of imposing financial
burden directly on a decision-maker for honest mistakes. Consequently, no deci-
sion-maker will be deterred "from exercising his judgment independently, force-
fully, and in a manner best.serving the long-term public interest." 420 U.S. at
542 [Vol. 44
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proceed against entities on an allegation that the deprivation complained
of "implements or executes" or is "visited pursuant to"129 official policy or
when such "execution ... inflicts"130 the injury. The class of acts done pur-
suant to a policy may be broader than the class of acts required by a policy,
especially where the policy encourages but does not mandate unconstitu-
tional conduct. Thus, McDonald appears to make the availability of
directly implied actions against municipalities for deprivations of constitu-
tional rights narrower than Monell does the remedy against municipalities
under section 1983.
The Seventh Circuit in McDonald assumed that the test for implying a
cause of action imposing vicarious liability on a municipality for a con-
stitutional violation "would have to be" whether imposition of liability is
"an appropriate and necessary prophylactic against constitutionally im-
proper acts of its agents." '1 31 Despite its observation that superior officers of
a governmental entity would be provided an incentive to supervise
employees to minimize constitutional violations by the threat against their
budgets posed by a directly implied civil remedy, the court was not per-
suaded that the "drastic" extension of directly implied causes to include
respondeat superior liability was needed.,3 2
Stephen Kostka was shot and killed by Westford, Massachusetts, police
officer David Hogg in the course of an arrest. In Kostka v. Hogg,13 3
Kostka's estate sought damages for a violation of the victim's fourteenth
amendment due process rights. 1 3 4 The First Circuit noted that it had juris-
diction over Westford under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but separated the jurisdic-
tional question from the question of whether the complaint stated a cause
320. Similarly, there is no likelihood that persons will be deterred from seeking
office by the prospect of "heavy burdens upon their private resources from
monetary liability. . . ." 420 U.S. at 320. Both the Supreme Court's dicta in
Monell that good faith immunity might apply to municipalities and the actual
application of qualified immunity to the City of Independence in Owen are ill-
considered. Where the defendant is the entity-employer, there is no need to
reconcile a plaintiff's right to compensation with the policy of protecting deci-
sion-making officials as there is where the defendant is an individual official. It is
speculative at best to suggest that a decision-maker would be intimidated by the
specter of the imposition of liability on the entity by whom she is employed. The
policy behind insulating decision-making officials from liability for constitutional
torts does not justify vicariously imputing the qualified immunity of the employee
to the municipal employer.
129. 436 U.S. at 690-91.
130. Id. at 694.
131., 557 F.2d at 604. The test is borrowed from Justice Harlan's concurrence
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 407 (1971).
132. 557 F.2d at 605.
133. 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977).
134. Id. Cf Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 3122 (1978) (action against municipality for damages for the killing of a
citizen by a policeman). See note 158 infra. 30
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of action. It held that because Congress had affirmatively acted to fore-
close municipality liability, as elaborated in Monroe and subsequent deci-
sions, there was no federal common law cause of action. The court ignored
allegations that the town was directly responsible for the plaintiff's
shooting death in that it failed to adequately instruct, train, educate, and
control Officer Hogg.'" "We focus on the precise remedy plaintiffs wish us
to create: one making a political subdivision vicariously liable in damages
for the constitutional wrongs of its employees.' 3 6 Like McDonald, the
language in Kostka is more restrictive of directly implied causes of action
than is Monell's of section 1983 causes: "Were we faced with a case in
which the municipality had ordered the constitutional violation, the appli-
cation of the constitutional test would be different." s Kostka does not
elaborate on what might constitute an entity's "ordering" a constitutional
violation. If the reference is understood to describe a case in which a
superior officer ordered unconstitutional conduct, the imposition of
liability on the entity for the issuance of such an order would clearly be
grounded on a theory of respondeat superior.'38 Kostka expressly disclaims
deciding whether its reasoning concerning respondeat superior liablity for
claims arising under constitutional guarantees other than fourteenth
amendment due process, or for claims seeking equitable relief instead of
damages, would be the same as that for direct actions against municipali-
ties for constitutional deprivations.'3 9
Although purporting to follow the Bivens dicta concerning affirmative
action by Congress, Kostha adopted only half of the rule: Bivens counseled
restraint in implying direct causes of action for constitutional violations
where the affirmative action of Congress was manifested in providing
another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress. 140 There is no
suggestion that a judgment for damages against a salaried policeman
would be equally effective, either to compensate the victim or to deter
repeated violations, as would be a judgment for damages against the
department or city for which that policeman acted when committing the
constitutional violation.
This pair of court of appeals decisions addressing the thorny question
of whether vicarious liability may be imposed against municipalities
through a remedy directly implied from the Constitution' 4' predated the
135. Cf. Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 165 n.37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 586 (1978).
136. 560 F.2d at 44.
137. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
138. See discussion of an analogous inconsistency in Monell in text accom-
panying notes 77-79 supra.
139. 560 F.2d at 45. The court does not suggest what considerations would
make such situations distinguishable, and it appears that its expansive view of the
evil Congress feared in rejecting the Sherman amendment (as explained in
Monroe) does not support distinguishing these situations.
140. 403 U.S. at 397. See text accompanying notes 117-19 supra.
141. The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered the question of
544 [Vol. 44
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decision inMonell. One federal circuit court of appeals has confronted the
question since Monell was decided. In Molina v. Richardson,142 the plain-
tiff, while driving his automobile in Los Angeles, was stopped by two
policemen who had noticed that the rear license plate did not bear a cur-
rent registration tab. He produced the registration tab and displayed his
license on request, but refused to remove the driver license from his wallet
and hand it over to the officers. The officers removed Molina from his car
whether to hold a municipality liable on a respondeat superior theory under a
directly implied action for constitutional violations. In Turpin v. Mailet, 579
F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 586 (1978), a 15-year-old boy had in an
earlier § 1983 action won a $3500 damage judgment against a police officer for
using excessive force in apprehending him. The judgment was paid by the
governmental entity's insurance company, and the West Haven Board of Police
Commissioners decided against disciplining the officer. Somewhat later Turpin
was arrested by other policemen on charges that were subsequently dropped.
Turpin brought an action for damages against the city on the theory that its
refusal to discipline the officer involved in the first incident encouraged its offi-
cers in the belief that they could disregard Turpin's constitutional rights with im-
punity, and had resulted in the false arrest.
The court of appeals ruled that the city could be held liable on a directly im-
plied cause of action if it were found to have directly caused the deprivation of the
plaintiff's rights, and that the plaintiff's complaint did not seek to impose liabil-
ity against the city on merely respondeat superior grounds:
[T]he actions and policy determinations of those in 'high office' may be
treated as the conduct of the governmental entity. Accordingly, we hold
that a damages action can be maintained against a municipality to
redress injuries resulting from those actions that have been authorized,
sanctioned, or ratified by municipal officials, or bodies functioning at a
policy-making level. Under such circumstances, it is clear that the
municipality, no less than the employee, has violated the constitution.
Id. at 164-65. The "authorized, sanctioned or ratified" test is repeated in the Tur-
pin court's summary of its holdings. This test clearly permits much broader
liability against municipalities under directly implied causes of action than would
the "required" test of McDonald or the "ordered by a superior" test suggested in
Kostka. It would seem to be at least as broad as Monell's "policy or custom" test
for § 1983 liability. The court in Turpin argues that where a municipal em-
ployee's unconstitutional action is authorized, sanctioned, or ratified at a policy-
making level by the municipal employer, the employer is itself in violation of the
Constitution and there are two wrongs to be remedied, but reasons that
respondeat superior liability would create an "additional remedy... for a single
constitutional infraction. It is not a case of redress for two distinct constitutional
violations." Id. at 166. The Turpin court's method of counting constitutional
violations is questionable. It is inaccurate to say that a situation in which the
employee acts in the absence of unconstitutional policy involves one constitu-
tional wrong, while a situation in which he acts to implement unconstitutional
policy involves two such wrongs. On the contrary, the latter situation involves
only one constitutional violation of which the law will recognize two causes, either
of which may be subjected to liability. Cast in these terms, it appears circular to
justify the refusal to impose respondeat superior liability by appeal to how many
causal agents the law will recognize as responsible for the single constitutional
deprivation.
142. 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1978).
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by force, took him to the police station and booked him for resisting arrest.
The prosecutor refused to file charges. Molina recovered $65.75 compen-
satory damages from each officer in a section 1983 action, and appealed
the dismissal of the city under both sections 1983 and a directly implied
cause of action with jurisdiction founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.143 The dis-
missal of the section 1983 claim was affirmed on the authority of Monell's
dicta that respondeat superior liability may not be imposed on a munici-
pality under section 1983. The court reasoned that Monell barred the sec-
tion 1983 action against Los Angeles because "Molina did not argue before
the district court that the allegedly illegal conduct of the officers 'may
fairly be said to represent [the city's] official policy.' "144 Molina here subtly
distorts Monell's test for municipality liability under section 1983. Monell
permits holding a municipality liable where its employee deprives plaintiff
of constitutional rights pursuant to a policy or custom attributable to the
entity because made by persons "whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy. . . .,145 That is, Monell did not limit the policy-
making class to those immediately involved in the deprivation of plaintiff's
constitutional rights. If unconstitutional policy or custom is created by
anyone who may fairly be said to represent official policy, and a govern-
mental employee injures someone by implementing that policy, the entity
is liable. Molina, in contrast, affirmed the dismissal of a section 1983 ac-
tion against Los Angeles because the "conduct of the officers" immediately
involved was not alleged to be fairly representative of official policy. 146 The
143. Id. at 847.
144. Id. at 848 (emphasis in original). The court's emphasis on the fact that
the conduct complained of was illegal appears to resurrect a defense for munici-
palities that was rejected in Monroe for individually named defendants. In
Monroe, the named police officers who had invaded and searched the Monroe
home without a warrant, and arrested and detained Monroe without warrant or
arraignment, had argued that they could not be held liable under § 1983 because
their actions violated the Constitution and laws of Illinois, and hence could not be
said to have been done "under color of" state law as required by the terms of
§ 1983. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169, 172 (1961). Monroe expressly
adopted a broad interpretation of "under color of' state law to include abuses of
power "made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law," id. at 184, and held that "the fact that Illinois by its Constitution and
laws outlaws unreasonable search and seizures is no barrier" to the liability under
§ 1983 of the individual defendants who had caused the deprivation of plaintiff's
federal constitutional rights. Id. at 183. The plaintiff inMonroe ultimately won a
judgment for $13,000 against the individual officers. 221 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ill.
1963). Monell in no way narrowedMonroe's construction of "under color of" state
law. If it may be said in another case that a city such as Los Angeles has caused a
deprivation of constitutional rights, Molina does not support a defense that the
city cannot be held liable because the acts causing the injury were also-illegal. A
municipal corporation can cause an injury, remediable even under the Supreme
Court's narrow construction of § 1983 "cause," through acts which are in viola-
tion of its own state laws and municipal ordinances.
145. 436 U.S. at 694.
146. 578 F.2d at 848.
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conduct of those officers should be considered in conjunction with the con-
duct of other patrolmen in Los Angeles, and if the aggregate evidences
customary disregard of constitutional rights of persons in Los Angeles,
liability should attach. While it was too late for the plaintiff in Molina to
seek to prove customary disregard of constitutional rights at trial, since
Monell was decided while Molina's appeal was pending, plaintiffs in subse-
quent incidents should not have that avenue foreclosed by a subtle mis-
reading of Monell.
Molina points out that a finding of general federal question jurisdic-
tion does not determine that a federal cause of action must also be recog-
nized.1 47 The court finds persuasive the argument that Congress has
precluded the implication of a Bivens action by supplying, in section 1983,
the exclusive remedy for constitutional violations committed under color
of state law. Nevertheless, the court declines to adopt that reason for re-
jecting Bivens liability against Los Angeles, because it perceives a nar-
rower ground for upholding the dismissal of the city.
Molina discusses three grounds for refusing to directly imply a cause of
action against the city for the imposition of respondeat superior liability:
respect for the proper role of Congress, federalism, and the adequacy of
the remedy in section 1983. Molina relies on Monell for the proposition
that "Congress has deliberately chosen to exclude vicarious liability against
municipalities from the scope of § 1983.1' 4 8 The court finds "special fac-
tors counseling hesitation"1 49 in implying respondeat superior liability
directly from the fourteenth amendment, especially since section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment expressly gives Congress a role in enforcing the
guarantees of that amendment, whereas the fourth amendment, on which
the cause of action was founded inBivens, does not similarly provide in ex-
press terms for legislative enforcement.150 Secondly, the court expresses
the view that if the federal judiciary were to "produce its own solutions to
every perceived need to protect individual rights against local government
action," the effect would be to inhibit the states themselves from develop-
ing "creative, efficacious resolutions to such disputes.' 51 Finally, the
court announces that it remains unpersuaded that the section 1983 remedy
is inadequate because of jury sympathy with individual defendants per-
ceived to have acted in good faith, or because respondeat superior liability
would more effectively deter future violations, deriding those arguments
as "speculative at best. 15 2
These factors counseling hesitation do not justify rejecting implied
respondeat superior. As discussed above, the Supreme Court's own analy-
147. Id. at 849.
148. Id. at 851.
149. Id. (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971)).
150. 578 F.2d at 851-52.
151. Id. at 852. See note 110 supra.
152. 578 F.2d at 853. 34
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sis does not support the conclusion that it was the vicarious liability feature
that led the House to reject the Sherman amendment, and even assuming
that it was vicarious liability for riot damage that was rejected, respondeat
superior is far narrower. 153
The creative resolution of disputes growing out of deprivations of con-
stitutional rights cited in Molina is not an unqualifiedly desirable develop-
ment. While indemnification of public employees for section 1983
damages judgments may assure that a plaintiff has access to the "deep
pocket" of the governmental employer, far from increasing protection for
individuals' constitutional rights from deprivation by state action, it
neutralizes any deterrent effect the section 1983 damages judgment
against an individual defendant might have exercised on the individual
constitutional tortfeasor. Access to a solvent defendant against whom to
execute a judgment for constitutional tort damages remains less desirable
than initial avoidance of constitutional violations. On the other hand, it is
not clear how extending implied respondeat superior liability would in any
way undermine the impetus to indemnify public employees for compen-
satory judgments growing from their constitutional torts.
Since the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Award Act of 1976154 makes
awards of attorney's fees discretionary with the trial court, the access to the
municipal "deep pocket" for compensatory damages is an incomplete solu-
tion even to the problem of compensating an injured plaintiff for the
deprivation. This inadequacy is especially apparent where the damages
are, as in Molina, small in comparison to the costs involved in winning the
judgment.
One additional avenue left open in the wake of Monell for holding a
municipality liable in federal courts on a theory of respondeat superior is
through state tort claims against the municipality where not barred by
local sovereign immunity, '55 provided a federal cause of action for a depri-
vation of plaintiff's constitutional rights arises out of a core of operative
fact common to the state claim.156 Pendent jurisdiction over such state
claims was temporarily set back by the Supreme Court's decision in
A ldinger v. Howard. 1s1 In A ldinger, the plaintiff was evaluated as an "ex-
cellent" employee of the defendant city, but was nevertheless allegedly
153. Vicarious liability is not the feature of the Sherman amendment that the
representatives singled out as objectionable. See text accompanying notes 98-101
supra.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. 1978).
155. The recent Missouri statute limiting governmental tort liability is
V.A.M.S. § 537.600 (Supp. 1979). The statute was passed in reaction to the
Missouri Supreme Court's prospective abrogation of sovereign immunity in Jones
v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. En Banc 1977). See generally,
Note, Torts-A brogation of Sovereign Immunity-Scope ofRetained Immunity,
43 Mo. L. REV. 387 (1978).
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 14. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
157. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
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wrongfully discharged for living with her boyfriend. The Court affirmed
the dismissal of both section 1983 and pendent state claims against the
municipality, relying on those aspects of Monroe's legislative history which
Monell has since declared to have been misinterpreted. 15 InAldinger, the
Court made its holding very explicit and very narrow:
All that we hold is that where the asserted basis of federal jurisdic-
tion over a municipal corporation is not diversity of citizenship,
but is a claim of jurisdiction pendent to a suit brought against a
municipal officer within § 1343, the refusal of Congress to author-
ize suits against municipal corporations under the cognate provi-
sions of§ 1983 is sufficient to defeat the asserted claim of pendent-
party jurisdiction. 159
Insofar as Congress is no longer seen as refusing to authorize suits against
municipal corporations, Monell may be taken as having removed the
reason for a blanket rejection of pendent-party jurisdiction in suits against
municipalities involving state causes of action. One commentator suggests
that Monell might be read by lower federal courts to perpetuate a bar to
pendent state claims against municipalities in either of two ways: courts
may assume that Monell lifts the Aldinger bar to asserting pendent state
claims against a municipality only to the extent that the municipality is
alleged to be directly responsible for a constitutional violation; or, even
where the plaintiff can comply with Monell's requirements by alleging
direct municipal responsibility, courts may hold that a state claim against
a municipality for vicarious constitutional violations does not derive from a
nucleus of facts common to the section 1983 claim against the employer for
directly causing the violation.1 60 The Monell dicta concerning vicarious
158. The dissenter in Molina apparently assumed Aldinger is still good law,
that "pendent party jurisdiction is not available in a Section 1983 action to join a
municipality on a state claim." 578 F.2d at 856 (Grant, J., dissenting). But
Monell clearly undercuts the reason offered in Aldinger for the rule. Cf Gagli-
ardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3122 (1978)
(held no error for district court to decline to decide whether to imply a cause of
action for holding the municipality vicariously liable but instead to hear the
merits of the pendent state wrongful death claim for damages growing out of an
incident in which a policeman allegedly failed to follow regulations on the use of
weapons).
159. 427 U.S. at 17-18 n.12 (1976). Just as courts refused to expand into
directly implied actions the municipality immunity which Monroe inferred from
the legislative history of§ 1983, Aldinger's rule on pendent party jurisdiction has
been rejected in state claims brought pendent to directly implied actions. Pitrone
v. Mercadante, 572 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 99 (1978)
(reversing dismissal of claims pendent to direct fourteenth amendment action
against township for alleged beating by police); Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3122"(1978).
160. Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope ofMunicipalLiabil-
ity in Federal Courts, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 409, 439 nn.165-69 (1978). Cf Smith &
Singer, Limitations on Federal Judicial Power in Civil Rights Cases: 'Persons,"
Eleventh Amendment, Immunities, Vicarious Liability, 14 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 711, 717-19 (1978). 36
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liability may provide as much support for the first approach described as
Monroe's doctrine of municipal immunity supported A ldinger. However,
the second approach mistakes the peripheral question of agency under
state law for that of the factual nucleus surrounding the injury to
plaintiff's rights common to both the state and federal claims.
In summary, Monell dramatically overrules Monroe's municipality im-
munity doctrine, which had shielded municipalities from liability under
section 1983 for seventeen years. In correcting its earlier construction of
the statute, however, the Supreme Court repeats the mistake of treating
the rejection of the Sherman amendment by the House in passing section
1983 as relevant to the liability sought to be imposed by that statute, and
fortifies its construction of section 1983 as excluding respondeat superior
liability with an unprecedentedly narrow analysis of the meaning of the
word "cause" as used in the statute. The rule against imposing liability on
municipalities for the constitutional torts of their employees might be
defended on the ground that such a rule provides some residual protection
for the budgets of municipal corporations against burdensome damage
judgments. If the Monell dicta against respondeat superior liability under
section 1983 is taken to be covertly grounded on fears of vexatious suits and
large damage judgments against municipalities, the rule is vulnerable to
attack on several grounds: this rationale would not justify barring actions
against municipalities for vicarious constitutional deprivations that seek
equitable relief instead of damages (although the statute itself speaks
equally of actions at law and suits at equity, and City of Kenosha v.
Brunot 6 1 explicitly rejected bifurcating the statute depending on the
nature of the relief sought); protection of the resources of municipal cor-
porations was not even mentioned by the Court in Monell as entering into
its reasoning respecting the availability of respondeat superior liability
under section 1983; and the Court should not have relied on such policy
considerations, inasmuch as the Congress had already determined that the
policy in favor of protecting municipal finances must give way to the
policies in favor of compensating persons who have suffered a deprivation
of constitutional rights and of deterring constitutional abuses by
municipalities. In the absence of an effective remedy under section 1983,
plaintiffs who rely on a respondeat superior theory to hold a municipal cor-
poration liable for constitutional infringements will be likely to resort to a
theory of recovery directly implied from the Constitution. Ample prece-
dent exists for treating the direct action as independent of constraints on
the scope of section 1983 that are peculiar to that statute, but courts seem
to be reluctant to impose vicarious liability in directly implied actions.
Holding the municipality vicariously liable in federal court through the
assertion of pendent state claims may be an alternative approach open to
the injured plaintiff, to the extent that state law permits holding the
161. 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973). See note 48 supra.
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municipal employer liable for its employees' torts, but the principles of
Aldinger v. Howard may be found to foreclose that alternative. Monell is
certain to have an impact on the entire field of constitutional litigation in-
volving municipalities, but it will be perceived as a mixed blessing by those
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